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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE LOWER COURT
This case is a civil action to enforce a promissory
Note and Trust Deed brought by Appellees herein, referred to collectively hereafter as "Security Funding," in the Third JudicialDistrict Court for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, Civil
No. C85-761.
52-60.

See Complaint and Amended Complaint, R. at 2-9,

The signer of the Note and Trust Deed, McDonald Brothers,

Inc. (hereafter "McDonald Brothers") raised various defenses to
the enforcement of the Note and Trust Deed, and also counterclaimed for damages against Security Funding.
and Counterclaim, R. at 63-77.

See Amended Answer

This Court has jurisdiction over

this appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(i).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues raised by this Appeal are as follows:
A.

Did the trial court properly rule that Security

Funding did not have the duties alleged by McDonald Brothers?
B.

Did the trial court properly rule that McDonald

Brothers' Note and Trust Deed was supported by consideration?
C.

Did the trial court properly rule that McDonald

Brothers1 obligations under the Note and Trust Deed were not
discharged?
D.

Were costs and fees awarded by the trial court

proper?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT.
Security Funding moved for summary judgment in its

favor on its Amended Complaint to enforce McDonald Brothers'
Trust Deed and Note, and on McDonald Brothers' Counterclaim for

fraud and negligence; and filed an exhaustive Supporting Memorandum in support of that motion.

See Memorandum in Support of

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. at 366-410.

McDonald

Brothers thereupon filed cross motions to dismiss Security
Funding's Amended Complaint, and for summary judgment on its
Counterclaim, and supporting memorandum.
416-426.

See R. at 413-415,

McDonald Brothers also filed a lengthy memorandum

opposing Security Funding's motion for summary judgment, which
did not provide any citations to the record to dispute Security
Funding's Statement of Undisputed Facts.

See R. at 427-467.

The hearing on all pending motions of the parties was
held on January 12, 1987, before the Honorable Michael J. Murphy
of the Third District Court.

At the hearing, Judge Murphy indi-

cated that he was inclined to grant Security Funding's motion for
summary judgment because McDonald Brothers had failed to provide
the Court with any citations to the record creating a genuine
issue of material fact.

See Memorandum Decision and Order dated

April 9, 1987, R. at 532-540.

The Court permitted McDonald

Brothers to submit a supplemental brief containing appropriate
citations to the record that it contended created a genuine issue
of material fact.

Id.

Thereafter, McDonald Brothers filed a

Supplemental Memorandum containing citations to the record, and
Security Funding submitted a Reply Memorandum.

See R. at

482-494, 495-520.
On April 9, 1987 Judge Murphy issued his Memorandum
Decision and Order granting the motion of Security Funding for
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summary judgment and denying McDonald Brothers' motions.

R. at

532-540.
II.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS.
The following statement of facts is taken for the most

part from citations to the record set out in the Statement of
Undisputed Facts contained in Security Funding's Summary Judgment
Memorandum, and in Security Funding's Reply to Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment.

R. at 368-377, 464-499.

Additional citations to the

record are included as necessary to respond to contentions and
arguments raised by McDonald Brothers for the first time on this
appeal.

These facts are not controverted by any evidence cited

to by McDonald Brothers either before the lower court or in its
Brief filed on this appeal.
1.

At all times relevant to this case, McDonald

Brothers was a Utah corporation engaged in buying and developing
real property.

See Deposition of Stevenson McDonald dated May

13, 1985, at 4-6 (cited as "S. McDonald Depo."), R. at 708, 702. 2

Although this Statement of Facts is lengthy, Security Funding believes that a working familiarity with the events giving rise to this litigation is absolutely essential to the
Court's consideration of this appeal. This is particularly
true since McDonald Brothers has frequently omitted citations to the record both in its Statement of Facts, and in
referring to alleged "facts" in the body of its Brief.
McDonald Brothers also sets forth a number of facts that it
claims are "undisputed," or "agreed," which are either contradicted by the record or are gross misstatements of the
record. These alleged "facts," will be refuted in the argument portions of this Brief.
Curiously, many of the depositions are present in duplicate
in the record. Both record citations will be given in this
Brief.
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Stevenson McDonald was the president of McDonald Brothers.
Howard McDonald was a general partner in a partnership known as
Silverwood Estates, in which McDonald Brothers was also a partner.

See Deposition of Howard McDonald dated May 13, 1985, at

4-7 (cited as "H. McDonald Depo."), R. at 703, 709.
2.

In the spring of 1981, Silverwood Estates was

in dire need of approximately three million dollars to complete a
large condominium project.

See H. McDonald Depo., at 18-19, R.

at 703, 709. After numerous unsuccessful attempts to secure a
loan on behalf of Silverwood Estates from banks and savings and
loans, Howard McDonald contacted Larry Sorenson ("Sorenson") as a
potential source for locating a three million dollar loan. See
H. McDonald Depo., at 19-20, 22, R. at 703, 709.
3.

Howard and Stevenson McDonald (hereafter col-

lectively referred to as "McDonalds") thereafter met with
Sorenson and engaged the services of Sorenson to obtain the three
million dollar loan for them.

See S. McDonald Depo., at 10-11,

19, R. at 708, 702; H. McDonald Depo, at 18-21, R. at 703, 709;
Deposition of Larry Sorenson dated May 5, 1986, at 21, 18-29
(cited as "Sorenson Depo. No. 2"), R. at 699, 714. McDonald
Brothers paid some of Sorenson's expenses to find a source for
its three million dollar loan, and was also to pay Sorenson a
commission out of the loan proceeds. Deposition of Larry
Sorenson dated May 7, 1985 (cited as "Sorenson Depo. No. 1"), at
30-31, 62, R. at 707, 713; Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 25-27, R. at
699, 714.
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4.

In connection with his attempts to obtain a

loan for McDonald Brothers, Sorenson contacted Bob Kenner, an
independent loan broker residing in California.

Sorenson Depo.

No. 2, at 17-18, R. at 699, 714. Around the first of August,
1981, Sorenson was informed that Kenner had found a source of
money for the three million dollar loan that Sorenson was seeking
for McDonald Brothers.
714.

Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 34, R. at 699,

Sorenson contacted Kenner, who informed him of a woman in

California named Linda Currier ("Currier") who had produced a
large loan and needed to borrow $288,000.00 in closing costs.
Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 34-35, R. at 699, 714.
5.

Thereafter, Sorenson and Dean Zabriskie

("Zabriskie"), Sorenson*s attorney, went to Pasadena, California
to meet with Currier.

Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 40-41, R. at 699,

714; Deposition of Dean Zabriskie dated May 5, 1986, at 12-15
(cited as "Zabriskie Depo. No. 2"), R. at 706, 710.
6.

At the Pasadena meeting, Currier explained

that she had already incurred $288,000.00 in "closing costs" for
a large loan of billions of dollars (hereafter "Currier Loan")
and required a loan for the $288,000.00 in closing costs.
Currier indicated that the proceeds of the Currier Loan would be
used to fund smaller loans, and that McDonalds Brothers1 three
million dollar loan could be funded out of these proceeds through
Sorenson.

Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 42-44, R. at 699, 714. It

was clear from the Pasadena meeting that the closing costs had to
be prepaid before the Currier Loan would come through.
Depo. No. 2, at 15-19, 28-29, R. at 706, 710.
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Zabriskie

7.

Thereafter, Sorenson and Zabriskie were par-

ties to a taped telephone call (hereafter "Taped Conversation")
with Currier and a man calling himself "Sasha Teplitz"
("Teplitz"),

In the Taped Conversation, Teplitz explained that

$288,000.00 in closing costs had already been incurred by Currier
for the large loan of billions of dollars, i.e., the Currier
Loan, and that Currier needed to obtain a loan for the
$288,000.00.

Zabriskie Depo. No. 2, at 9-10, 28-31, 33-34, R. at

706, 710; Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 55-58, R. at 699, 714.
8.

It was clear from the Taped Conversation that

the $288,000.00 in closing costs had already been incurred, and
that this amount would have to be paid by Currier before the
Currier Loan would close.

See Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 56-58, R.

at 699, 714; Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 20-21, 27, R. at 707, 713;
Zabriskie Depo. No. 2, at 17-18, 30-33, 80-81, 93, R. at 706,
710.

Sorenson and Zabriskie both understood from the Taped Con-

versation that the $288,000.00 would be "at risk" during a three
to seven day period before the Currier Loan closed, and that the
$288,000.00 to be loaned to Currier was not reimbursable regardless of whether the Currier Loan failed to close.

Sorenson Depo.

No. 2, at 57-58, 67-71, R. at 699-714; Zabriskie Depo. No. 2, at
17-18, 30-34, 80-81, R. at 706, 710; Zabriskie Depo No. 1, at
71-72, R. at 698, 712.
9.

The Taped Conversation also explained that

the $288,000.00 would have to be wired by the lender directly to
Teplitz, i.e. to an account under the control of Teplitz referred
to in the Taped Conversation and thereafter by the parties as the
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"Fourex" account.

See Deposition of David Garrett dated November

14, 1983, at 5-6, 11-12, 19-22, 42-43 (cited as "Garrett Depo.
No. 1"), R. at 718; Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 62-63, 129-130, R.
at 699, 714; Deposition of R. Christenson dated May 8, 1985, at
22-24 (cited as "Robert Christenson Depo."), R. at 700; Deposition of N. Christenson, dated May 8, 1985, at 11-13 (cited as
"Neil Christenson Depo."), R. at 701, 711; Zabriskie Depo. No. 2,
at 15-18, 28-33, R. at 706, 710; Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 25-27,
72, R. at 707, 713.

Sorenson had the understanding that Teplitz

was acting as an "escrow agent" for Currier with respect to the
$288,000.00 loan, and that the "escrow" account where the
$288,000.00 was to be wired was Sasha Teplitz's "Fourex" account.
See Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 26-27, R. at 707-713.
10.

Sorenson thereafter began to look for poten-

tial sources for the $288,000.00 loan to Currier.
No. 1, at 23, R. at 707, 713.

Sorenson Depo.

Sorenson wanted to obtain the

closing costs for the Currier Loan so that he could then obtain
the three million dollar loan for McDonald Brothers from the proceeds.

Sorenson was also to obtain a $100,000.00 finder's fee

from Currier out of the loan proceeds, in exchange for finding a
lender for the $288,000.00.
at 707, 713.

Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 71-72, R.

Sorenson was subsequently given the name of Neil

Christenson of Security Funding Corporation as a potential lender
of the $288,000.00 to Currier.

Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 9-10, R.

at 703, 713.
11.

Around the first of August 1981, Sorenson and

Zabriskie met with Security Funding representatives to solicit
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them to loan the $288,000.00 to Currier.
Taped Conversation was played.

At this meeting, the

Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 32-33,

R. at 707, 713; Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 73, R. at 699, 714; R.
Christenson Depo., at 14-15, R. at 700.
12.

Security Funding agreed to loan the

$288,000.00 to Currier only if sufficient collateral for the loan
was provided.

See Zabriskie Depo. No. 2, at 36-38, 44-45, R. at

706, 710; Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 15-16, 36-37, R. at 707, 713;
Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 65-66, R. at 699, 714; N. Christenson
Depo., at 16, 23-24, R. at 701, 711; Zabriskie Depo. No. 1, at
34-35, R. at 706, 710.
13.

Thereafter, Sorenson approached Stevenson

McDonald and requested him to provide security for the
$288,000.00 loan by signing a Trust Deed and Note in favor of
Security Funding.
ing.

Dean Zabriskie was also present at this meet-

Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 35-37, R. at 707, 713.

Sorenson

represented to Stevenson McDonald that by providing security for
the $288,000.00 loan to Currier, McDonald Brothers would ultimately obtain its three million dollar loan from the proceeds of
the Currier Loan, as well as a $250,000.00 bonus to be paid by
Currier from the loan proceeds.

Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 35-37,

68-72, R. at 707, 713; H. McDonald Depo., at 16-17, 42-43, R. at
703, 709; S. McDonald Depo., at 14, 29-30, R. at 702, 708.

At

this meeting, the McDonalds also listened to the Taped Conversation in which Teplitz explained the nature of the loan transaction.

See H. McDonald Depo., at 16, 26, R. at 703, 709.
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14.

On or about August 21, 1981, Robert

Lamoreaux, a law partner of Zabriskie1s, met with Stevenson
McDonald to have him execute the Trust Deed and Note in favor of
Security Funding.

S. McDonald Depo., at 16-18, R. at 702, 708.

Stevenson McDonald executed the Trust Deed and Note on behalf of
McDonald Brothers and gave them to Lamoreaux, with the understanding that they would be delivered to and relied upon by Security Funding as security for the $288,000.00 loan.
McDonald Depo., at 31-36, R. at 703, 709.

id.; H.

Stevenson McDonald and

Security Funding also executed escrow instructions to Barrett
Title, which instructions provided that Barrett Title could record McDonald Brothers1 Trust Deed if the $288,000.00 was not paid
to Security Funding within twenty days.

See Exhibit 3, H.

McDonald Depo., R. at 703, 709; S. McDonald Depo., at 9-10, R. at
702, 708.
15.

Based on the meeting with Sorenson and

Zabriskie, Stevenson McDonald knew and understood that the
McDonald Brothers would not actually receive the $288,000.00 from
Security Funding; and knew and understood that the $288,000.00
would be sent by Security Funding directly to a third party
[Currier] whose identity Stevenson McDonald knew at the time, but
could not recall at the time of his deposition.

S. McDonald

Depo., at 14-20, 26, 28-35, R. at 702, 708; see also H. McDonald
Depo., at 33-34, R. at 703, 709.

Stevenson McDonald did not

expect to have any control over the release of the $288,000.00
loan by Security Funding to Currier; and was relying on Sorenson
and Zabriskie to protect his interests in the transaction.
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S.

McDonald Depo., at 14-20, 26, 28-35, R. at 702, 708; see also H.
McDonald Depo., at 37, 41, 76-77, R. at 703, 709.
16.

In addition to the Trust Deed and Note pro-

vided by Stevenson McDonald, Currier provided her own property in
California as security for the $288,000.00 loan and executed two
Notes in the total amount of $288,000.00 in favor of Security
Funding.

See R. Christenson Depo., at 14-16, 20-21, Exhibits 6

and 7, R. at 700.
17.

It was the understanding and intent of Secu-

rity Funding, Sorenson and Zabriskie at all times that Currier
was primarily obligated to repay the $288,000.00 to Security
Funding, and that Currier's property was to be resorted to first
by Security Funding in the event that the Currier Loan failed to
close within the three to seven days anticipated.

See Sorenson

Depo. No. 2, at 63-65, 69, 69-71, R. at 699, 714; R. Christenson
Depo., Exhibit 15; Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 33-35, 35-36, 68-71,
R. at 707, 713; Zabriskie Depo. No. 2, at 16-17, 37-38, 43-44, R.
at 706, 710; Zabriskie Depo. No. 1, at 34-35, 70, R. at 698, 712.
18.

In addition to the Currier and McDonald

Brothers properties, Mountain West America also signed a Trust
Deed and Note in favor of Security Funding to secure the
$288,000.00 loaned by Security Funding to Currier.
Depo. No. 1, at 46-48, R. at 707, 713.

See Sorenson

It was the understanding

and intent of Sorenson and Security Funding that the Mountain
West America property was to be used only as temporary collateral
until title reports were obtained on the other security for the
$288,000.00 loan, at which time the Mountain West Trust Deed was
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to be released.

Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 47-48, R. at 707, 713;

Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 58-59, R. at 699, 714; R. Christenson
Depo., Exhibit 15.

It was ultimately determined that a falsified

title report had been issued for the Mountain West property, and
that the Trust Deed was valueless.

See N. Christenson Depo., at

34, R. at 701, 711; Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 47, R. at 707, 713.
19.

On August 21, 1981, Sorenson and Zabriskie

flew to Camden, New Jersey with David Garrett of Security Funding
to meet with Currier and Teplitz ("New Jersey Meeting").
Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 23-24, R. at 707, 713; Sorenson Depo.
No. 2, at 110-111, R. at 699, 714; Deposition of David Garrett
dated May 8, 1985 (hereafter "Garrett Depo. No. 2"), at 11-12, R.
at 704, 715.

Stevenson McDonald was informed that Sorenson and

Zabriskie were in Camden, New Jersey, by Lamoreaux and was relying on Sorenson and Zabriskie to protect his interests.

S.

McDonald Depo., at 14-20, 28-35, R. at 702, 708; H. McDonald
Depo., at 30-32, 37, 41, 76-77, R. at 703, 709; Sorenson Depo.
No. 2, at 62, R. at 699, 714.
20.

Sorenson's purpose for going to the New Jer-

sey Meeting was to see that the Currier Loan closed so that he
could then obtain the three million dollar loan for McDonald
Brothers from the proceeds of the Currier Loan.
No. 2, at 71-73, R. at 699, 714.
Sorenson while in New Jersey.

Sorenson Depo.

Zabriskie was representing

Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 24, R. at

707, 713; Zabriskie Depo. No. 2, at 48-50, R. at 706, 710.
21.

Security Funding's purposes in sending

Garrett to the New Jersey Meeting were to assure that its
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collateral was properly in place before the $288,000.00 was wired
to the "Fourex" account upon the instructions of Currier/Teplitz;
and to generally assure itself that Currier and Teplitz were
legitimate.

See Garrett Depo. No. 1 at 9, 12-16, R. at 718;

Garrett Depo. No. 2, at 16, R. at 704, 715; N. Christenson Depo.
at 24, R. at 701, 711.
22.

During the New Jersey Meeting, Security Fund-

ing wired the $288,000.00 to an account in New Jersey under
Teplitz1s name, called the "Fourex" account, upon the instruction
of Teplitz and Currier, as conveyed through David Garrett.
Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 59-63, 109-110, 129-130, R. at 699, 714;
Garrett Deposition No. 1, at 5-6, 19-22, 42-43, R. at 718;
Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 23-27, 29, 34, 70-72, R. at 707, 713;
Zabriskie Depo. No. 2, at 15-18, 28-33, 50, R. at 706, 710;
Zabriskie Depo. No. 1, at 30-31, R. at 698, 712; N. Christenson
Depo., at 11-13, 25-26, R. at 701, 711; Garrett Depo. No. 2, at
11-12, R. at 718; R. Christenson Depo., at 22-24, R. at 700.
These instructions were consistent with those in the Taped Conversation.

See Zabriskie Depo. No. 1, at 55-56, R. at 698, 712;

Garrett Depo. No. 1 at 5-6, 11-12, 19-22, 42-43, R. at 718;
Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 61-63, 107, 109-110, 129-130, R. at 699,
714; R. Christenson Depo. at 22-24, R. at 700; N. Christenson
Depo. at 11-13, R. at 701, 711; Zabriskie Depo. No. 2 at 15-18,
28-33, R. at 706, 710. The $288,000.00 was in fact received in
the "Fourex" account.

See N. Christenson Depo., at 25, R. at

701, 711; Garrett Depo. No. 1, at 21, R. at 718. Sorenson was
aware that the transfer of the $288,000.00 to the "Fourex"
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account in New Jersey was taking place at the time the transfer
was being made. Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 109-110, R. at 699, 714.
23.

After the money was wired to the "Fourex"

account, Garrett, Zabriskie, Currier and Teplitz flew to Nassau
where the closing of the Currier loan was supposed to take place.
Garrett Depo. No. 1, at 26-27, R. at 718; Garrett Depo. No. 2, at
22-24, R. at 704, 715.

Garrett had no specific purpose for going

to Nassau, and was invited along by Currier to be present when
the loan closed.

Id.

24.

McDonald Brothers never received its expected

three million dollar loan from the Currier Loan funds.

There is

no evidence in the record to indicate whether or not Currier in
fact had a potential loan for billions of dollars that she and
Teplitz were attempting to close.

In addition, there is no evi-

dence in the record on whether or not the $288,000.00 was or was
not used to pay the closing costs that had already been incurred
for such a loan.
25.

McDonald Brothers kept in close touch with

Sorenson and Zabriskie concerning the status of the Currier Loan
after the New Jersey meeting.

S. McDonald Depo., at 23, R. at

702, 708; H. McDonald Depo., at 45-47, R. at 703, 709; Zabriskie
Depo. No. 2, at 88-90, R. at 706, 710.
26.

In November of 1981, an Agreement was entered

into between Sorenson and Security Funding.

See Sorenson Depo.

No. 2, at 76-78, R. at 699, 714; Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 66-68,
R. at 707, 713.

In this Agreement:

-13-

a.

Security Funding agreed to extend the

time for filing a notice of default against the McDonald property
until January 15, 1982;
b.

Security Funding agreed to release its

Trust Deed on the property of Mountain West America, according to
the prior agreement of the parties;
c.

Security Funding agreed to release the

McDonalds' property if amounts due under the Note were paid by or
on behalf of Currier during the life of the Agreement; and
d.

Sorenson agreed to satisfy the obliga-

tion to Security Funding if he consummated another transaction
similar to that of the Currier Loan.

Sorenson Depo. No. 2,

Exhibit 15, R. at 699, 714.
27.

Sometime in July of 1982 the McDonalds were

contacted by Garrett of Security Funding by telephone.

This was

the first time any representative of McDonald Brothers had ever
spoken to anyone from Security Funding.
47-48, R. at 703, 709.

H. McDonald Depo., at

Howard and Stevenson McDonald subse-

quently met with representatives of Security Funding.

H.

McDonald Depo., at 47-48, R. at 703, 709; N. Christenson Depo.,
at 32-33, R. at 701, 711.
28.

During the first meeting with Security Fund-

ing in July of 1982, McDonald Brothers indicated that it was
still hopeful that the Currier Loan would go through.

H.

McDonald Depo., at 47-48, R. at 703, 709; S. McDonald Depo., at
22-23, R. at 702, 708.

Thereafter, the McDonalds met several

times with representatives of Security Funding to discuss the
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progress of the Currier Loan.

At these meetings, Security Fund-

ing indicated that it wanted to extend the time for Currier to
repay the $288,000.00, and the McDonalds indicated that they
thought it would be a good idea to extend the time for Currier to
perform.

H. McDonald Depo., at 48-49, 51-52, R. at 703, 709.
29.

In approximately November of 1983, Security

Funding brought an action to foreclose on Currier's property in
California, Case No. NEC35385.

R. at 408-409.

Through this

action, Security Funding obtained $157,347.00, which amount was
applied to the accrued interest under the Note executed by
McDonald Brothers.
30.

In February of 1985 Security Funding brought

this action to enforce the Note and Trust Deed given by McDonald
Brothers.

R. at 2.

On June 2, 1987 judgment was entered against

McDonald Brothers in the total amount of $505,261.12 in favor of
Security Funding.

R. at 645-649.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

McDonald Brothers makes three primary arguments in support of its contentions that summary judgment in favor of Security Funding was improperly granted by the trial court; and that
summary judgment in favor of McDonald Brothers was improperly
denied.
In Points I and II of its Brief, McDonald Brothers
argues that Security Funding breached various duties allegedly
owed to it by failing to assure (1) that the $288,000.00 in fact
was used for closing costs; (2) that the $288,000.00 was not
released to Currier until the Currier loan was closed; (3) by
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failing to establish an "escrow account" or act as an "escrow
agent" on behalf of McDonald Brothers; and (4) by failing to
assure that McDonald Brothers received its 3 million dollar loan.
Security Funding1s response to these contentions is that there is
no probative evidence in the record to suggest that it agreed to
such duties; and that such duties cannot be implied in law under
the undisputed facts in the record.

Because Security Funding

cannot be charged with the alleged duties as a matter of law,
McDonald Brothers1 arguments in Points I and II of its Brief are
without merit.
In Point III of its Brief McDonald Brothers argues that
the "bargained for" consideration for the Note and Trust Deed was
Security Funding's "promise . . . to pay the closing costs on the
Currier loan, so that the McDonalds could obtain their $3 million
financing."

This argument fails as a matter of law, on the

ground that Security Funding made no such promise to McDonald
Brothers; and any such promise made by Sorenson or Zabriskie is
3
not attributable to it, as a matter of law.
Point IV of McDonald Brothers1 Brief argues that
because Security Funding allegedly extended the time for Currier
to perform, and released its Trust Deed given by Mountain West
America, McDonald Brothers is discharged.
fails as a matter of law.

3

This argument also

McDonald Brothers expressly consented

McDonald Brothers does not challenge the trial court's finding that Security Funding may not be charged with the
alleged fraud of Sorenson and Zabriskie as a matter of law.
See Memorandum Decision and Order, R. at 532-540. Therefore, this issue will not be addressed by Security Funding
in this Brief.
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to extensions of time and to the release of collateral in the
Note.

McDonald Brothers also verbally consented to any exten-

sions given to Currier.

Finally, release of the Mountain West

Trust Deed did not discharge McDonald Brothers because (1)
McDonald Brothers cannot and has not shown injury; (2) McDonald
Brothers' actual or apparent agent, Sorenson, consented to this
release; and (3) the release was justified because the parties
intended the property to be temporary collateral.
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
McDonald Brothers has appealed both the summary judg-

ment in favor of Security Funding, and the trial court's denial
of its cross motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.

In

reviewing a trial court's grant of a summary judgment, the
reviewing court applies the same standard as the trial court.
That standard is whether, reviewing the entire record as a whole
and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, there is any colorable evidence creating a genuine issue
of material fact.

See National American Life Ins. Co. v. Bayou

Country Club, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 417, 403 P.2d 26 (1965); Thornock
v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979); Blodqett v. Martsch, 590
P.2d 298 (Utah 1978).

Under this standard, factual findings of

the trial court are not entitled to any particular deference; and
the sole question is whether the record supports the trial
court's grant of summary judgment.

Similarly, the standard of

review on appeal of a trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment is whether, viewing the record as a whole, there is
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any genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.
Id.
A "genuine" issue of fact exists where:
[t]here is sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for
that party. [Citations omitted]. If the evidence
is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. . . .
The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the [non-moving party's] position will
be insufficient. There must be evidence on which
a jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving
party]. The judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. . . .
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).

Frivo-

lous and spurious factual issues will not defeat a motion for
summary judgment.

See Hanko v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 1280

(W.D. Penn. 1984); In re Norsom Manufacturing Reference Laboratory, 41 B.R. 846, 847-48 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1984); Bonqiovanni v.
N. V. Stoomvaart-Maats, 458 F. Supp. 602, 605 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (dicta).
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF SECURITY FUNDING.
A.

Security Funding's Only Obligation to McDonald Brothers
was to Disburse $288,000.00 at the Direction of
Currier/Teplitz.
Points I and II of McDonald Brothers1 Brief argue that

the "uncontroverted" and "stipulated" evidence shows that Security Funding owed a "duty" to McDonald Brothers to establish an
escrow for the $288,000.00; and/or assure that the $288,000.00
was applied to the "closing" of the Currier Loan; and/or to
assure that McDonald Brothers received its three million dollar
loan from the proceeds of the Currier Loan (referred to
-18-

collectively hereafter as the "Duty Arguments").

See McDonald

Brothers Brief, at 15-19, 21-25. McDonald Brothers also appears
4
to argue that its "guaranty" of the Currier loan was expressly
conditioned on the actual use of the $288,000.00 loan by Currier
for closing costs, and on Mcdonald Brothers1 receipt of its three
5
million dollar loan from the Currier Loan proceeds.
McDonald

4

McDonald Brothers1 characterizes itself on this Appeal as a
"guarantor" of Security Funding's loan of $288,000.00 to
Currier. It bears noting that this argument is inconsistent
with the claims made by McDonald Brothers before the lower
court, and with the facts alleged in McDonald Brothers1
pleadings. The McDonald Brothers vigorously argued before
the lower court that it expected to directly receive the
$288,000.00, which it would then loan to Currier; and that
this agreement was breached when the funds were wired to
Currier/Teplitz. See Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3,
paragraph 1, R. at 483-84; Answer and Counterclaim, R. at
18; Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R. at 64, 67;
Defendant's Responsive Memorandum, R. at 271, 277-278; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's
Motion for Dismissal and for Summary Judgment, R. at 418;
Defendant's Responsive Memorandum to Plaintiff's Memorandum
in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, R. at 429.
Security Funding does not dispute McDonald Brothers' admission that it was secondarily liable for the $288,000.00, and
that Currier was primarily obligated. However, the proper
legal status of the parties is that McDonald Brothers was an
"accommodation party" for Currier, based on the fact that
McDonald Brothers signed a negotiable instrument for the
$288,000.00 rather than a guaranty. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, at 29-34,
R. at 392-398. For purposes of this Brief and this appeal,
whether McDonald Brothers is characterized as a guarantor or
as an accomodation party to Currier is irrelevant, however.

5

McDonald Brothers' Brief states:
[c]ertainly the McDonalds knew and understood that the
funds Christenson paid would go to a third person.
That knowledge is fundamental to being a surety, indemnitor or guarantor. The McDonalds' expectation, never-

Footnote continued on next page.
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Brothers also claims that "the money [$288,000.00] was not even
paid to Currier, Tepletz, or anyone else remotely connected with
the transaction."

McDonald Brothers Brief, at 17.

McDonald Brothers claims that because the above events
did not occur (1) Security Funding's claim is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands; (2) Security Funding has breached an
implied duty of "good faith and fair dealing"; and (3) Security
Funding has breached a fiduciary duty owed to McDonald Brothers.
These various and interrelated arguments of McDonald Brothers
fail as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts contained
in the record.
1..

The Record Shows that Security Funding Wired the
$288,000.00 to the "Fourex" Account at the Direction of Currier and Teplitz.

McDonald Brothers' contention that Security Funding did
not wire the $288,000.00 to Currier/Teplitz, but instead released

Footnote continued from previous page.
theless, was that their property was pledged only if
the funds being guaranteed were applied to closing the
Currier loan so that they could get their $3 million
loan. It was in fact, agreed, and found as a fact by
the trial judge, that the McDonalds pledged their property only in the expectation of receiving financing
from Currier1 s jumbo loan. . . .
McDonald Brothers' Brief, at 21-22 (emphasis added).
6

This claim is also inconsistent with McDonald Brothers'
pleadings. Prior to this Appeal, McDonald Brothers had pled
and argued that Security Funding released the funds to an
account over which Sasha Teplitz/Linda Currier had control.
See Defendant's Responsive Memorandum to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, at 17,
R. at 443; Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum, at 11, R. at
492; Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R. at 72.
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it to a "stranger" is both unsupported by, and contradicted by
the record (including the McDonald Brothers1 own pleadings, see
supra note 6 ) . The record clearly shows (1) that the Taped Conversation, heard by McDonald Brothers, provided that the
$288,000.00 would be wired to an account designated as the
"Fourex" account, which was under the control of Teplitz, see
Undisputed Facts paragraph 9, supra at 6-7; and (2) that Security
Funding in fact wired the $288,000.00 to the "Fourex" account at
the express direction and instruction of both Teplitz and
Currier.

See Undisputed Facts paragraph 22, supra at 12-13.
The California deposition of Garrett, dated November

14, 1983, and published and made a part of the record in this
case by Judge Murphy's Memorandum Decision and Order, contains
the most detailed description of the disbursement of the
$288,000.00 by Security Funding.

See Garrett Depo. No. 1, at

5-6, 11-12, 19-22, 42-43, R. at 718.

Security Funding urges the

Court to read these excerpts from the Garrett Deposition.

The

deposition testimony of others, although less detailed, is consistent with Garrett's California deposition testimony.

See

Undisputed Facts paragraph 22 (containing citations to deposition
testimony relating to disbursement of the $288,000.00), supra at
12-13.

Indeed, there is no contradictory testimony in the rec-

ord.
Based on the undisputed evidence in the record,
McDonald Brothers' claim that Security Funding did not wire the
$288,000.00 to Currier/Teplitz is frivolous and unfounded.
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2.

Security Funding Did Not Have the Duties Alleged
by McDonald Brothers,

In determining whether Security Funding had the
"duties" alleged by McDonald Brothers, this Court must focus on
the agreement of the parties.

This agreement must be found

either in the written instruments executed by McDonald Brothers;
or to the extent that these instruments are ambiguous, in extrinsic evidence.

Security Funding submits that there is no evi-

dence, extrinsic or otherwise, suggesting that it agreed with
McDonald Brothers to undertake the duties alleged.

In addition,

there is no basis in law for implying these duties.

Accordingly,

all of the arguments made in Points I and II of McDonald Brothers' Brief based on these alleged duties fail, as a matter of
law.
(a)

Security Funding did not Expressly Agree to
the Duties Alleged by McDonald Brothers.

McDonald Brothers cites to deposition testimony indicating that Security Funding representatives and other parties to
the transaction "expected" the $288,000.00 to be held in an
"escrow" account until the Currier Loan closed, in support of its
argument that Security Funding agreed and/or had a duty to establish the "escrow" or to assure that the $288,000.00 was not disbursed to Currier until the Currier loan closed.

See McDonald

Brothers1 Brief, at 15-18.
The question before this Court is not the subjective
expectations of McDonald Brothers or anyone else, but whether
there is any colorable evidence in the record to show that Security Funding promised McDonald Brothers that it would establish
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an actual

escrow account; or assure that the $288,000.00 was

held in an actual escrow until the Currier Loan closed; or assure
that the $288,000 was in fact applied to closing costs by
Currier. 8
The McDonald Brothers have not cited to any evidence in
the record showing or even suggesting that Security Funding
expressly agreed to undertake the duties alleged by McDonald
9
Brothers; and indeed, the record contains no such evidence.
Security Funding's "agreement" was to place the $288,000 "into
the hands of" Currier/Teplitz," upon being provided with adequate
security.

See Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 34, 71-72, R. at 707,

713; Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 58-60, R. at 699, 714; Undisputed
Facts paragraphs 9, 12, supra at 6-8.

Sorenson solicited

McDonald Brothers to provide its Note and Trust Deed as security
for the loan to Currier, and McDonald Brothers did so.
Undisputed Facts paragraphs 13-15, supra at 8-10.

See

McDonald

7

It is clear from the record that the term "escrow" was
loosely used by the parties to refer to the Fourex account
controlled by Teplitz. Notwithstanding the use of the term
"escrow," all parties understood that the $288,000.00 would
be at "risk" for a period of time until the Currier Loan
closed, in that the $288,000.00 could be expended without
the Currier Loan coming through. See Undisputed Facts paragraph 8, supra at 6. This fact was made clear on the Taped
Conversation, listened to by all parties including McDonald
Brothers. See Undisputed Facts paragraphs 8, 13, supra at
6, 8.

8

It should be noted that there is no evidence to show that
the $288,000 was not used for "closing costs."

9

The deposition testimony relied on by McDonald Brothers
merely confirms that the $288,000 was to be placed by Security Funding "into the hands of Sasha Teplitz;" and that
Sorenson understood that "the escrow account was Sasha
Teplitz1 accounts." See McDonald Brothers Brief, at 15-16.
-23-

Brothers intended and expected to be secondarily liable to
Currier, the primary obligor.

McDonald Brother's Brief, at 1.

It is undisputed that Security Funding made no representations to
McDonald Brothers concerning the release of the $288,000,00 to
Currier.
Although it was represented by Sorenson, Currier and
Teplitz, and understood by Security Funding, that Currier needed
the $288,000.00 loan in order to pay for the closing costs that
had been incurred for the Currier Loan, Security Funding's loan
to Currier was not made on the "condition" that the proceeds be
used for closing costs.

Similarly, McDonald Brothers1 Note and

Trust Deed was unconditional on its face, and was unconditionally
delivered to Security Funding.

The Barrett Title escrow instruc-

tions executed by Stevenson McDonald were also unconditional, and
simply provided that if the McDonald Brothers' Note in favor of
Security Funding was not paid within twenty days, the Trust Deed
could be recorded.

See Undisputed Facts paragraph 14, supra at

9.
In short, Security Funding made no oral representations
or agreements to McDonald Brothers (or to anyone else) concerning
the release of the $288,000.00; and the instruments executed by
McDonald Brothers in connection with the transaction do not
require Security Funding to establish an escrow; nor do they
state that McDonald Brothers' liability is contingent or is otherwise conditioned on a particular use of the proceeds by
Currier.

Therefore, the only remaining question is whether the
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duties claimed by McDonald Brothers can be implied in law under
the facts in the record.
(b)

Security Funding Cannot be Charged in Law
with the Duties Alleged by McDonald Brothers.

Security Funding is aware of no legal precedent that
would impose upon it "implied" duties to establish an escrow; or
to assure that Currier used the $288,000.00 for closing costs; or
to assure that McDonald Brothers received a three million dollar
loan promised by Sorenson.

See generally, Thormahlen v. Citizens

Savings & Loan, 73 Or. App. 230, 698 P.2d 512 (1985) (extent of
lender's common law duty determined by agreement); Seitzinger's,
Inc. v. National Bank of Washington, 490 F. Supp. 340, 343
(D.D.C. 1980) ("An undisclosed intention is not to be considered
in enforcing a contract"); Sessions, Inc. v. Moreton, 491 F.2d
854 (9th Cir. 1974) (a party who performs as it is entitled to do
by the terms of its agreement does not violate an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); see also Kidman v. White,
14 Utah 2d 142, 378 P.2d 898, 899 (1963) (contracting party is
bound "only to the extent the terms expressly indicate, or at
least fairly and reasonably imply").
In the absence of fraud attributable to the creditor, a
guarantorfs liability will not be construed as "contingent" on
the happening of an event or on the performance of some act by
the creditor or by a third party, unless such act or contingency
is set out in the written instrument or is expressly agreed to by
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the creditor.

See Nat. Bank of Washington v. Equity Investors,

81 Wash. 2d 886, 506 P.2d 20, 38-40 (1973); Rucker v. Republic
Supply Co., 415 P.2d 951, 953 (Okla. 1966); Packaging Corp. of
America v. Morris, 561 P.2d 680 (Utah 1977); 38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty S 50 (1973); Baird v. Stephanf 52 N.D. 568, 204 N.W. 188,
188-90 (1925); Security Nat. Bank of Fargo v. Andrews, 53 N.D.
328, 205 N.W. 732, 733 (1925); United States v. Everett Monte
Christo Hotel, 524 F.2d 127, 131 (9th Cir. 1975); Consolidation
Coal Co. v. Deskins, 178 Ky. 663, 199 S.W. 779, 781 (1918);
Seitzinger's. Inc. v. Nat. Bank of Washington, 490 F. Supp. 342,
343 (D.D.C. 1980); Lenwood State Bank v. Lientz, 413 S.W.2d 248,
255 (Mo. 1967).

This is true although the party soliciting the

guaranty has represented that liability thereunder will be contingent, or that the guarantor will receive some additional benefit in return for executing the guaranty.

See Rabon v. Putnam,

164 F.2d 80, 83 (10th Cir. 1947); First National Bank of Denver
v. Caro Constr. Co., Inc., 211 Kan. 678, 508 P.2d 516 (1973).

10

This rule is illustrated by the case of Seitzinger1s, Inc.
v. Nat. Bank of Washington, 490 F. Supp. 340 (D.D.C. 1980).
In that case, the creditor sued a guarantor; and the guarantor raised as a defense that it did not intend its guaranty
to be effective unless and until other guarantors were
obtained. In rejecting this argument, the Court stated:
[t]here is no evidence that defendant ever indicated to [the creditor] that the guaranty was not
to be effective until signed by Mr. Smith. . . .
An undisclosed intention is not to be considered
in the process of construing and enforcing a
contract.

Id. at 343.
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The above rules apply whether or not the instrument
signed by McDonald Brothers is construed as a note or as a guaranty.

See Piedmont Engineering & Const. Corp. v. BoGradinq Con-

tractors, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 718r 218 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1975);
Main Bank of Chicago v. Baker, 427 N.E.2d 94, 98-99 (111. 1981);
Great Western Bank & Trust Co. v. Pima Savings & Loan Assoc, 149
Ariz. 364, 718 P.2d 1017 (Ariz. App. 1986).
In this case, any intent or understanding of McDonald
Brothers that its obligation was conditioned on Security Funding
establishing an escrow, assuring that the $288,000.00 was used
for closing costs, or assuring that the $288,000.00 was not disbursed until the Currier Loan closed, was neither stated nor
agreed to by Security Funding.

Indeed, the record shows that

McDonald Brothers was not even relying on Security Funding to
assure that these things occurred, but rather was relying on
Sorenson and Zabriskie.

See Undisputed Facts paragraph 15,

supra at 9-10.
Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that
Sorenson and Zabriskie actually represented to McDonald Brothers
that its obligation under the Note and Trust Deed was conditioned
on the closing of the Currier Loan, or that the $288,000.00 would
be held in escrow until the Currier Loan closed (contentions that
find no support in the record), any such representations cannot

11

It should also be noted that McDonald Brothers1 claim that
it even had such expectations is open to question, in view
of the fact that the Taped Conversation clearly indicated
that the $288,000.00 would be expended whether or not the
Currier Loan closed. See Undisputed Facts paragraph 8,
supra at 6.
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be attributed to Security Funding, as a matter of law.

See

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment,
at 15-26, R. at 380-391.

Based on the foregoing, there is abso-

lutely no basis, either in the agreement of the parties or in
law, for imposing the "escrow" duties alleged by McDonald Brothers on Security Funding.
3,

The Doctrine of "Unclean Hands" is Inapplicable.

McDonald Brothers makes a bizarre argument on pages
15-20 of its Brief that because Security Funding failed to establish an "escrow" and/or failed to assure that the Currier Loan
closed, it is "responsible" for the McDonald Brothers1 loss and
therefore cannot enforce the Trust Deed and Note under the doctrine of "unclean hands."13 It is obvious from the record, as
cited to and discussed above, that Security Funding neither
agreed to nor had any such responsibilities.

Moreover, the doc-

trine of unclean hands requires some showing of bad faith,
oppressiveness, fraud or deceit for its application.

See Park v.

Jameson, 12 Utah 2d 141, 364 P.2d 1, 3 (1961); Jacobson v.
Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976); Seal v. Seal, 212 Kan. 55,

12

This argument was fully briefed and argued before the trial
court, which ruled that the alleged representations of
Sorenson and Zabriskie could not be attributed to Security
Funding as a matter of law. See Memorandum Decision and
Order, R. at 532-540. McDonald Brothers have not appealed
this finding.

13

This is the first time McDonald Brothers has raised this
argument. The "unclean hands" defense was not raised in the
pleadings and was not presented to the trial court. Cf.
Mosley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 45 N.M. 230, 114 P.2d 740
(1941) (doctrine of unclean hands cannot be applied for
first time at appellate level except on a strong showing).
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510 P.2d 167 (1973).

There is absolutely no evidence that Secu-

rity Funding acted unfairly, in bad faith or fraudulently with
respect to McDonald Brothers.

Therefore, the doctrine of unclean

hands does not apply, as a matter of law.
4.

Security Funding Did Not Breach a Duty of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing.

McDonald Brothers also argues that Security Funding
14
breached an implied "duty of good faith and fair dealing"
owed
to McDonald Brothers under the Restatement of Contracts and the
Uniform Commercial Code, by failing to assure that the
$288,000.00 was held in escrow and/or was used for closing costs
for the Currier Loan.

The implied duty of good faith and fair

dealing requires good faith both in the performance of contractual obligations, and in the enforcement of a contract.
Restatement (Second) Contracts S 205 (1983).

See

It is not a vehicle

for imposing contractual obligations where the contract is
silent, however.
In support of its argument that Security Funding has
breached an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, McDonald
Brothers cites to a number of cases discussing a lender's implied
obligations to its debtors.

These cases are distinguishable from

this one in respects too obvious and numerous to detail in this

14

This is also the first time that McDonald Brothers has made
this argument. Both in its pleadings and before the lower
court, McDonald Brothers argued that Security Funding acted
negligently, but did not argue that Security Funding had
breached implied contractual duties. For this reason, Judge
Murphy ruled that "there is no evidence to support any claim
of a duty owed by any plaintiff to defendant. Such a duty
is a necessary predicate to defendant's negligence counterclaim." R. at 532-540.
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Brief.

Most significantly, however, in the cases relied on by

McDonald Brothers the duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed
on the lender simply required good faith in performing an express
15
obligation of the contract.
In other words, the underlying
obligation to be performed in good faith was a part of the written agreement, and was not itself "implied."

See cases cited

supra note 15.
In contrast to the cases cited above, McDonald Brothers
is attempting to imply, from thin air, material contractual obligations in addition to those contained in the written agreement.
There is no support in the case law for using the duty of good
faith and fair dealing to impose new and additional contractual
obligations where the contract is silent.

Consistent with this,

courts hold that a party who performs as it is entitled to do by
the terms of its agreement does not breach an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.

15

See Sessions, Inc. v. Moreton, 491

See, e.g., Cohen v. Ratinoffy 195 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Cal. App.
1983) (lessor must reasonably withhold consent under discretionary contract provision requiring consent to assignment
of lease); State v. Farah Manufacturing Co., Inc., 678
S.W.2d 661, 685 (Tex. App. 1984) (to exercise acceleration
at will clause, lender must believe in good faith that security is impaired); Brown v. Avemco Investment Corp., 603
F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979) (acceleration clause must be exercised in good faith); KMC Co., Inc., v. Irving Trust Co.,
757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (duty of good faith required
lender to give notice before refusing to advance funds under
discretionary loan agreement); Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982) (creditor must exercise
good faith in exercising contractual right to repossess collateral on debtor's default); Yankton Production Credit
Assoc, v. Larsen, 365 N.E.2d 430 (Neb. 1985) (lender's
refusal to make discretionary advances under loan agreement
must be in good faith); First Nat'l. Bank v. Twombly, 689
P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984) (acceleration clause in loan must be
exercised in good faith).
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F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1974); VTRf Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 303 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see also Thormahlen v.
Citizens Savings and Loan, 73 Or. App. 230, 698 P.2d 512 (1985)
(extent of lender's common law duty determined by agreement).
As already discussed, Security Funding1s agreement was
to loan $288,000.00 to Currier, if sufficient security was provided.

In response to this request, Sorenson provided the uncon-

ditional "guaranty" (consisting of the Note and Trust Deed) of
McDonald Brothers.

Security Funding's only "agreement" was to

disburse the $288,000.00 at the direction of Currier/Teplitz; and
this is exactly what occurred.

See Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 34,

R. at 707, 713; Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 58-60, R. at 699, 714;
supra at 26-28.
direction of

Security Funding's disbursement of funds at the

Currier/Teplitz satisfied its obligations to

McDonald Brothers and rendered McDonald Brothers' Note and Trust
Deed enforceable.

See infra pages 35-41, Section B (discussing

consideration requirement).

Accordingly, McDonald Brother's con-

tention that Security Funding breached an implied obligation of
good faith and fair dealing fails as a matter of law.
5.

Security Funding Did Not Owe Any Fiduciary Duty to
McDonald Brothers.

On pages 27-28 of its Brief, McDonald Brothers argues
that Security Funding owed fiduciary duties to it as "trustee" of
a resulting trust for McDonald Brothers' benefit.

McDonald

Brothers also appears to argue that Security Funding owed fiduciary duties to it based on Security Funding's alleged status as an
"escrow agent."

See McDonald Brothers' Brief, at 27-28.

Both of

these arguments are raised for the first time on this appeal.
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Security Funding agrees with the general rule that an
escrow agent occupies a fiduciary relation with respect to both
parties to an escrow.

See King v. First National Bank of

Fairbanks, 647 P.2d 596 (Alaska 1982).

However, there is abso-

lutely no evidence in the record to support McDonald Brothers
contention that an escrow relationship existed between it and
Security Funding.
An "escrow relationship11 is defined in the case law as
follows:
[a]n escrow relationship is essentially a
three-party contract* Generally, it arises in the
first instance by agreement between two parties
concerning the delivery of an instrument upon the
occurrence of a specified future condition. The
instrument is thereafter deposited, by separate
agreement, with an independent third party with
instructions concerning its ultimate
delivery. . . .
In the absence of such a tripartite contractual arrangement, the special duties
of an escrow agent do not attach to a third party
in possession of the instrument.
Weiqel v. Hardesty, 37 Colo. App. 541, 549 P.2d 1335 (1976)
(rejecting claim that attorney had duties of escrow agent).
Accord, Hiqqins v. Kittleson, 1 Ariz. App. 244, 401 P.2d 412
(1965); see also Banif Corp. v. Black, 12 Or. App. 385, 507 P.2d
49 (1973) (escrow agent must be independent from the parties to a
transaction).

16

The Nevada Court articulated a similar definition in Hoffman
v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 90 Nev. 267, 523 P.2d 848,
850 (1974), in rejecting a plaintiff's claim of an escrow on
summary judgment:

Footnote continued on next page.
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The record contains no evidence to suggest that Security Funding had the status of an escrow agent as defined above.
McDonald Brothers has not alleged an "agreement" between itself
and anyone else whereby it would conditionally deposit the Note
and Trust Deed with Security Funding to be held until the performance of a specified condition (presumably the closing of the
Currier Loan).

Rather, McDonald Brothers deposited its Note and

Trust Deed with Barrett Title, with instructions that the Trust
Deed could be recorded if the Note was not paid in twenty days.
See Undisputed Facts paragraph 14, supra page 9.
Moreover, even if McDonald Brothers was to claim that
such an agreement existed, for example, between itself and
Currier or Sorenson (a contention also without support in the
record), Security Funding obviously could not function as an
escrow agent because it is not independent, but rather is a party
to the very documents to be deposited in the alleged escrow.

See

Banif Corp. v. Black, 12 Or. App. 385, 507 P.2d 49 (1973).
Finally, to have the duties of an escrow agent, Security Funding

Footnote continued from previous page.
[a] valid escrow agreement is a triangular
arrangement. First there must be a contract
between the seller and the buyer agreeing to the
terms and conditions of the deposit, then there
must be delivery of the items on deposit to the
escrow agent, and he must agree to perform the
function of receiving and disbursing the items.
The agreement by the buyer and the seller to all
the terms of the escrow instructions and the
acceptance by the escrow agent of the position of
depository create the escrow.
Hoffman, at 850.
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would have had to receive delivery instructions from the two parties to the escrow agreement, and would have had to agree to act
as a depository on behalf of the two parties to the escrow agreement.

There is no evidence of any of these prerequisites to an

escrow arrangement, and therefore McDonald Brothers1 claim that
Security Funding owed it a fiduciary duty as an escrow agent
fails as a matter of law.
McDonald Brothers1 "resulting trust" theory similarly
fails as a matter of law, on the ground that there is absolutely
no evidence in the record to establish any element necessary to a
claim that Security Funding held the $288,000.00 as trustee of a
resulting trust in favor of McDonald Brothers.

A resulting trust

is based on intent, and arises only where all the facts and circumstances show that the parties intended that one party hold
property in trust for the benefit of the other.
Jones, 459 P.2d 603 (Okla. 1969).

See Jones v.

Therefore, McDonald Brothers'

admission that it was secondarily liable for the $288,000.00, and
that Currier was the primary borrower precludes any claim that
Security Funding was to hold the $288,000.00 in trust for
McDonald Brothers' benefit.

Accordingly, McDonald Brothers'

"resulting trust" theory fails as a matter of law.
There are no other facts in the record that could conceivably support McDonald Brothers' claim of a fiduciary duty
owed to it by Security Funding.

Under Utah law, a fiduciary duty

must be based either on a long-standing relationship of trust and
confidence that allows one party to dominate and influence the
other, or on the existence of a traditional fiduciary
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relationship such as an attorney/client relationship.

See Von

Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985).

Neither of these
17
requirements are satisfied here, as a matter of law.
B.

McDonald Brothers1 Note and Trust Deed are Supported by
Consideration
McDonald Brothers makes three arguments in support of

its claim that the Note and Trust Deed are not supported by con18
sideration. These arguments are addressed below.

17

It is obvious that Security Funding does not occupy a traditional fiduciary relationship with McDonald Brothers. The
relationship between Security Funding and McDonald Brothers
is one of debtor and creditor. Both the Restatement of
Trusts and the Utah case of Denshaw v. Tracy Loan & Trust,
27 Utah 364, 49 P.2d 403 (1934), state that a creditor does
not owe a fiduciary duty to its debtors. See Restatement of
Trusts § 12 comment b (1959); see also American Bank of Commerce v. Corolo. 88 N.M. 405, 540 P.2d 1294, 1296 (1975)
("No authority is cited for the remarkable proposition that
a bank owes fiduciary duties to its debtors and obligors.
Notwithstanding the growth of consumerism, this nirvana is
yet to be reached").
There is also no evidence of any kind of a relationship of
trust and confidence between Security Funding and McDonald
Brothers that would give rise to a fiduciary duty. In fact,
neither Howard nor Stevenson McDonald met or even spoke to
Security Funding representatives until nearly one year after
Stevenson McDonald executed the Note and Trust Deed. See
Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Memorandum, at 12, paragraph
26, R. at 377.

18

McDonald Brothers1 third "argument" on the consideration
issue can be addressed in a footnote. On page 36 of its
Brief, McDonald Brothers apparently argues that because
Security Funding "agreed" to loan $288,000.00 to Currier
before Sorenson solicited security from McDonald Brothers,
the Note and Trust Deed are not supported by consideration.
It is clear from the record that Security Funding's "agreement" to loan $288,000.00 to Currier was contingent upon
receiving sufficient collateral; and that the loan was not
in fact made Security Funding had assured itself that it had

Footnote continued on next page.
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McDonald Brothers argues on pages 29-33 of its Brief
that the consideration "bargained for" by McDonald Brothers was
"the promise of Christenson to pay the closing costs on the
Currier loan, so that the McDonalds could obtain their $3 million
financing."

McDonald Brothers Brief, at 30.

In support of this

argument, McDonald Brothers cites various cases to the effect
that a failure of consideration occurs if the lender fails to
perform a material promise, or if an express condition to liability fails to occur or is not performed.

See, e.g., Silver Waters

Corp. v. Murphy, 177 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1965); Benson v. Andrews,
138 Cal. 2d 123, 292 P.2d 39 (1955); and Grebe v. Swords, 149
N.W. 129 (N.D. 1914) (relied on by McDonald Brothers).
Security Funding does not dispute the general rule of
the authorities relied on by McDonald Brothers.

Rather, it dis-

putes McDonald Brothers1 claim that Security Funding "promised"
or "agreed" that the $288,000.00 would be used for closing costs,
or that McDonald Brothers' liability was "conditioned" on such
use or on receiving a three millon dollar loan.

Absent colorable

evidence of such a "promise" either made by or attributable to
Security Funding, McDonald Brothers' consideration argument fails
as a matter of law, for the reasons discussed in detail below.

Footnote continued from previous page.
sufficient collateral, which included the security provided
by McDonald Brothers. See Undisputed Facts paragraphs 12,
21, supra at 8, 11-12.
The deposition testimony of Sorenson relied on by McDonald
Brothers simply does not stand for the cited proposition,
when read in context. See Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 23-36,
R. at 707, 713.
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1.

Security Funding's Payment of $288,000.00 to
Currier at Her Direction is Consideration for the
Note and Trust Deed.

As previously noted, (see supra page 19 note 4) prior
to this appeal McDonald Brothers argued that the $288,000.00 loan
was to it, not Currier; and that because Currier received the
loan proceeds rather than McDonald Brothers, the Note was not
supported by consideration.

In refuting this argument before the

trial court, Security Funding cited to evidence in the record
establishing (1) that McDonald Brothers knew and understood that
it would not receive the loan proceeds and that the proceeds
would be disbursed to Currier; and (2) that McDonald Brothers did
not expect to control the disposition of the $288,000.00 to
Currier.

See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs1 Motion for

Summary Judgment, at 27-29, R. at 390-393; Plaintiff's Reply to
Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment, at 8-18, R. at 502-412.
court agreed.

The trial

See Memorandum Decision and Order, R. at 532-540.

Now McDonald Brothers has changed its story, and apparently concedes that the loan proceeds were to be disbursed to
Currier, and not to it.

McDonald Brothers' Brief, at 1 and note

1. Regardless of whether McDonald Brothers is viewed as a "maker"
of a note; as an "accommodation party" to Currier; or as a "guarantor" of Security Funding's loan to Currier, however, the same
result is reached on the consideration issue.

See supra at 19

note 4.
As argued in detail in Security Funding's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R. at 393-399, a maker of
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a note need not receive the note proceeds for consideration to
exist.

Consideration for a note exists where the proceeds are

distributed to a third party with the maker's acquiescence or
consent.

See Unruh v. Nevada Nat. Bank, 88 Nev. 427, 498 P.2d

1349 (1972); see also Villeqas v. Bagwell, 529 P.2d 1011 (Okla.
1974).
Similarly, the disbursement of loan proceeds to the
principal debtor provides consideration for a guaranty, as a matter of law.

See Paul Revere Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Weis,

535 F. Supp. 379, 385 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Public Loan Co., Inc. v.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 803 F.2d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1986);
Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood Dev. Corp., 655 P.2d 668, 669
(Utah 1982).

A guaranty is also supported by consideration if

the lender extends credit in reliance on it. See Bank of Idaho
v. Collev. 103 Idaho 320, 647 P.2d 776, 782 (Idaho App. 1982).
Finally, an accommodation party is liable if the primary obligor receives the loan proceeds. See Bank of America
Nat. Trust & Savings Assoc, v. Goldstein, 25 Cal. App. 2d 37, 76
P.2d 545, 547 (1938); Luby v. Jefferson County, 28 Colo. App.
441, 476 P.2d 292, 294 (1970).
The record shows that Currier, the primary obligor,
"received" the $288,000.00, in that the money was wired to the
"Fourex" account of Teplitz at Currier1s express direction and
with her express consent.

See supra at 20-21; Unruh v. Nevada

National Bank, 498 P.2d 1349 (Nev. 1972). As already discussed,
McDonald Brothers1 speculation that the proceeds were not wired
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to Currier or Teplitz, but were disbursed to a complete stranger
is frivolous and unsupported by the record.
The record further shows that McDonald Brothers gave
the Note and Trust Deed to Lamoreaux with the intent and expectation that these documents would be used to induce Security Funding to loan $288,000,00 to Currier.
graph 14, supra at 9.

See Undisputed Facts para-

Finally, the record shows that Security

Funding detrimentally relied on the security provided by McDonald
Brothers in disbursing the $288,000.00 to Currier.
puted Facts paragraphs 12, 21, supra at 8, 12.

See Undis-

This undisputed

evidence establishes that the instruments executed by McDonald
Brothers are supported by consideration, whether or not McDonald
Brothers is viewed as maker, guarantor or accommodation party.
2.

Security Funding Did Not Promise or Agree that the
$288,000.00 Would be Used for Closing Costs or
that McDonald Brothers1 Obligation was
Conditional.

McDonald Brothers attempts to avoid the general rules
set out in Subsection 1 above by arguing that it bargained for,
and received, the "promise" of Security Funding "that the closing
costs on the Currier Loan would be paid so that the McDonalds
could secure their three million dollar loan."
Brothers's Brief, at 31.

McDonald

It is true that the general rules dis-

cussed in Section 1 above may not apply where a debtor's obligation is effectively conditioned on an act or event besides the
disbursement of proceeds to the principal debtor; or where a
creditor has expressly promised some additional performance to
the debtor.

In such a case, the failure of a condition, or the

creditor1s breach of an additional promise may render the
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obligation unenforceable for failure of consideration.

Cf.

Benson v. Andrews, 292 P.2d 39 (Cal. App. 1955) (lender's failure
to furnish advances as expressly agreed constitutes failure of
consideration) (cited by McDonald Brothers).
As already discussed in detail on pages 22-28 of this
Brief, however, the record does not contain a shred of probative
evidence that Security Funding "promised" McDonald Brothers that
the $288,000.00 loan would be used for closing costs; or that
McDonald Brothers' obligation was conditioned either on Currier's
use of the loan proceeds for closing costs, or on McDonald Brothers receiving their $3 million loan.
tions cannot be implied in law.

In addition, these obliga-

See supra at 25-28.

Finally,

Security Funding cannot be bound by any representations or agreements made by Sorenson in order to induce McDonald Brothers to
execute the Note and Trust Deed.

See Memorandum in Support of

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 15-27, R. at 380-392;
Memorandum Decision and Order, at 532-540.

Accordingly, McDonald

Brothers' consideration defense fails as a matter of law.
3.

The Trial Court's Ruling that the Note and Trust
Deed was Supported by Consideration is Supported
by Its Findings of Fact.

McDonald Brothers strangely argues, on pages 33-36 of
its Brief, that statements made by the trial court in its Memorandum Decision and Order show that it did not receive consideration for the Note and Trust Deed.

This argument reflects a fun-

damental misconception concerning the scope of this Court's
review of a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary
judgment.

As stated on pages 17-18 of this Brief, this Court

-40-

stands in the same position as the trial court, and reviews the
record as a whole.
In any event, however, the trial court's statement that
McDonald Brothers "understood that the proceeds of the loan which
its Trust Deed and Note secured would be paid to another person
to be used as closing costs for the Currier loan" obviously cannot be interpreted as a "finding" by the trial court that
McDonald Brothers' obligation was conditioned on such use.

This

and similar statements in the Memorandum Decision and Order must
be viewed in the context of McDonald Brothers' argument at that
time, which was that it was to directly receive the proceeds, not
Currier.

See supra page 18, note 4.

trial court.

This was the focus of the

Moreover, as already noted, McDonald Brothers'

unspoken "understanding" concerning the contemplated use of the
loan proceeds does not operate to impose any duties on Security
Funding with respect to such use, as a matter of law.

See supra

at 25-31.
C.

McDonald Brothers' is not Released of Its Obligations
Under the Note.
McDonald Brothers argues that it is released from lia-

bility under the Note as a matter of law: (1) because the time
for Currier to perform was "extended" by Security Funding; (2)
because Security Funding released "the interim collateral furnished by Mountain West;" and (3) because Security Funding negotiated an increased "bonus" from Currier.
Brief, at 37 (emphasis added).
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See McDonald Brothers'

1.

McDonald Brothers Consented to Extensions of Time
for Repayment and to the Release of Collateral in
the Note.

McDonald Brothers relies on Utah Code Ann. S 70A-3-606
(1981) for the argument that it is released by Security Funding's
"extension" of the time for repayment to Currier.

This Section

provides as follows:
(1) The holder discharges any party to the
instrument to the extent that without such party's
consent the holder
(a) without express reservation of rights
releases or agrees not to sue any person against
whom the party has . . . a right of recourse or
agrees to suspend the right to enforce against
such person the instrument or collateral . . .; or
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral given by
or on behalf of the party or any person against
whom he has a right of recourse. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-606 (1981) (emphasis added).
Effective consent to an extension of time for repayment
or to the release of collateral may be given in advance in the
instrument itself.

See William D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial

Code Series § 3-606:06, at 66 (1984) (cited as Hawkland).
Accordingly, courts uniformly enforce express provisions of notes
and guaranties providing that the parties thereto consent to
extensions of the time for repayment or to the release of collateral.

See, e.g., Schauss v. Garner, 590 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Wyo.

1979); Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. v. Southeastern
Uni-Loader, 134 Ga. App. 156, 213 S.E.2d 536, 537 (1975); Liberty
Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Interstate Motel Developers, 346 F.
Supp. 888, 889-90 (S.D. Ga. 1972); see also Cessna Finance Corp.
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v> Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Utah 1978) (enforcing guarantor's
waiver of notice of default contained in instrument).
As in the cases cited above, McDonald Brothers
expressly consented to all extensions of the time for repayment
and to the release of any collateral in the Note itself.

The

express terms of the Note executed by McDonald Brothers are as
follows:
[t]he makers, sureties, guarantors, and endorsers
hereof severally waive presentment for payment,
demand and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of
this note, and consent to any and all extensions
of time, renewals, waivers or nullifications that
may be granted by the holder hereof with respect
to the payment or other provisions of this note,
and to the release of any security, or any part
thereof, with or without substitution.
See H. McDonald Depo., Exhibit 1 (emphasis added), R. at 703,
709.
McDonald Brothers argues that the language quoted above
does not apply to any extensions given to Currier.

This argument

is inconsistent with its argument that McDonald Brothers1 was
merely the "guarantor" of Currier's primary obligation to Security Funding, however.

It is undisputed that Security Funding

made only one loan for $288,000.00, and that Currier was primarily obligated to repay this loan, while McDonald Brothers1 was
only secondarily obligated.

Thus, any payments by Currier would

necessarily be applied to and would reduce the obligation of
19
McDonald Brothers under the Note.

19

Given these facts, any

In fact, payments by Currier (i.e., received from the foreclosure on Currierfs California real property) were in fact
applied to the balance due under the Note. See R. at 409.
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extensions of time granted to Currier fall within the express
consent provisions of the Note signed by McDonald Brothers, as an
M

extension[s] of time . . . granted . . . with respect to the

payment , . . of this note,"

In other words, any extension to

Currier, whom McDonald Brothers concede was primarily liable for
the $288,000,00, and whose payments would be applied to satisfy
McDonald Brothers' obligations under the Note, constitutes an
"extension . . . with respect to the payment" of the $288,000.00
Note executed by McDonald Brothers.
Moreover, even if this Court should find that the consent language in the Note is not applicable, the undisputed evidence in the record shows that McDonald Brothers in fact were
informed of, and consented to, an extension of the time for
Currier to perform.

Both Howard and Stevenson McDonald indicate

that they were still hopeful that the Currier Loan would close as
late as the summer of 1982.
supra at 15.

See Undisputed Facts paragraph 28,

During their meetings with Security Funding at that

time, McDonald Brothers agreed that the time should be extended
for Currier's performance.

H. McDonald Depo. at 48-49.

Consent

to an extension can be given either before or after the fact.
See U.C.C. § 3-606, Official Comment 2.
2.

Security Funding's Release of the Mountain West
America Property Does Not Discharge McDonald
Brothers.

Security Funding submits that McDonald Brothers
expressly consented to the release of any security for its obligation in the Note.
ers

f,

consent[s] . . .

The Note clearly states that McDonald Brothto the release of any security, or any
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part thereof, with or without substitution."

This language con-

stitutes effective "consent" to the release of the Mountain West
property under Section 3-606 as a matter of law.

See Continental

Bank & Trust Co. v. Utah Security Mortgage, 701 P.2d 1095, 1098
(Utah 1985) (holding that guarantors had agreed to waive any
defenses based on impairment of collateral, based on language of
instrument).
In addition, Security Funding's release of the Mountain
West property does not discharge McDonald Brothers because the
release was "justified."

See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-606(b)

(1981) ("unjustified" impairment causes discharge).

It is undis-

puted that the Mountain West security was not intended to secure
the McDonald Brothers' obligation, but rather was intended only
to be "interim" security, see McDonald Brothers1 Brief at 37,
that would be released when a title report was obtained on the
McDonald Brothers1 and Currier's property.
paragraph 18, supra at 10-11.

See Undisputed Facts

In addition, McDonald Brothers,

through their actual or apparent agent Sorenson, contracted with
Security Funding to release the Mountain West collateral pursuant
to the prior understanding of the parties.
paragraph 26, supra at 13-14.

See Undisputed Facts

Based on these facts, Security

Funding was entitled to release the Mountain West property, and
Section 3-606 does not apply.
Finally, even if the Court finds: (1) that there is
sufficient evidence in the record to support McDonald Brothers'
claim that the the Mountain West property was given as additional
security for its obligations under the Note; and (2) that
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McDonald Brothers did not consent to the release either in the
Note itself or thereafter through its agent Sorenson, McDonald
Brothers has failed to identify any evidence in the record to
show that the release of the Mountain West collateral harmed
McDonald Brothers.

The rule is that a holder discharges a party

to an instrument only to the extent that his unjustifiable
impairment of collateral has caused injury.

The standard for

determining "injury" based on impairment of collateral is the
extent to which the collateral, if not released by the creditor,
could have been used to satisfy the obligations on the instrument.

See Christensen v. McAtee, 256 Or. 333, 473 P.2d 659

(1970); Farmers State Bank of Oakley v. Cooper, 227 Kan. 547, 608
P.2d 929, 936 (1980).

McDonald Brothers have the burden of proof

to show the amount or value of the alleged impairment.

Id.

There is absolutely no evidence in the record to indicate that the Mountain West collateral had any value.

Indeed,

the evidence in the record indicates that the title search for
the Mountain West property was falsified, and that the Trust Deed
obtained by Security Funding was in fact valueless.

See Undis-

puted Facts paragraph 18, supra at 10-11.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's conclusion
that McDonald Brothers had not introduced sufficient evidence to
support its claim of discharge is supported by the record, and
must be upheld.
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED COSTS TO SECURITY FUNDING.
In response to McDonald Brothers' argument that Security Funding was awarded excessive fees and costs, Security
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Funding refers this Court to its "Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Objection to Proposed Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure
and Order of Sale and Motion for Reconsideration, and in Support
of Plaintiff's Motion to Strike," R. at 627-638.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MCDONALD BROTHERS' SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTION.
McDonald Brothers does not argue on this Appeal that

issues of fact prevent this Court from affirming summary judgment
in favor of Security Funding.

Rather, McDonald Brothers argues

that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor as a matter
of law.

In order to prevail on this argument, McDonald Brothers

must establish at least one of its defenses to the enforcement of
the Note and Trust Deed as a matter of lav.

However, as argued

in detail above, all of McDonald Brothers' defenses fail as a
matter of law.

Moreover, if this Court were to rule that summary

judgment in favor of Security Funding was improperly granted,
factual issues would then preclude summary judgment.

There are a

number of factual arguments raised in the pleadings that the
trial court found it unnecessary to reach in granting Security
Funding's Motion for Summary Judgment, which Security Funding is
entitled to present.
CONCLUSION
McDonald Brothers has contrived a number of defenses to
Security Funding's enforcement of its Note and Trust Deed, many
of which are raised for the first time on this Appeal.

When the

facts in this case are analyzed, it is clear that McDonald Brothers' defenses have no merit, as a matter of law.
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Accordingly,

this Court should uphold the trial court's grant of summary -judgment in favor of Security Funding.
DATED this aQ**~

day of December 1987.
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